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ABSTRACT
Two decades ago, the federal government attracted many private developers to the
affordable housing market by offering 40 year notes at low rates of interest. In exchange, owners
agreed to maintain the properties as low and moderate income housing. The owners also had the
right to prepay the mortgages after 20 years and end the subsidized use restrictions. Concern
about the potential loss of affordable housing through the prepayment of a large percentage of
these notes prompted Congress to enact legislation which regulates prepayment while offering
incentives to keep the housing affordable.
While the terms of that legislation are complex, owners basically have three options from
which to chose: hold , sell or refinance the property. The option that is chosen is the outcome
of a complex decision making process involving: owners, tenants and the government. The
process is made more demanding by the fact that the owners are simultaneously developer,
property manager, taxpayer and general partner. These intertwining and possibly conflicting
relationships have a much greater impact on the motivations of owners to chose one of the three
options than the simple motive of maximizing profit.
This study takes a close look at the expiring use issue from the owners' viewpoint.
Interviews with practitioners in the field, as well as the observations of several property owners
who have recently been involved in the process of selling or refinancing in the current regulatory
environment, have resulted in some general observations about what motivates an owner in the
decision making process.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes
Title: Professor of City Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In the mid 1980's, the potential loss of rental housing
for low and moderate income families insured under sections
221 ((d)3 and 236 of the National Housing Act became a
steadily increasing concern. Owners who had financed their
properties through the program 20 years earlier, now had the
option of prepaying the notes in the late 1980's and early
1990's. This prepayment would have eliminated the
restrictions on allowable uses; therefore, the housing
became known as "expiring use restricted properties". In
response to the perceived risk of owners prepaying, new
regulations were enacted which restrict the prepayment of
the federally insured mortgages. In exchange, owners would
be given a range of incentives to keep the housing
affordable. The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation
Act (ELIHPA) was enacted by Congress in 1987 to temporarily
restrict prepayment. The Low Income Housing Preservation
and Resident Home Ownership Act (LIHPRHA) was passed in
1990. With some modifications, LIHPRHA made permanent the
emergency act of 1987.
In essence, the options available to the owners under
both acts can be pared down to three choices:
(a) Do Nothing and Wait: Leave the current financing and
rental stream as they already are.
(b) Sell the Development: LIHPHRA closely regulates the sale
of the property must be offered to non-profit groups first.
The government may allow a potentially higher sale price
based on the highest and best use of the property.
(c) Refinance the Development: While placing restrictions
on the amount of additional debt which can be placed on the
property, both LIHPRHA and ELIHPA offer incentives, such as
rent subsidies, for the owners to maintain the affordability
of the development.
This thesis examines the three primary options
available to the owners from the perspective of the owner to
determine how decision makers ultimately chose among the
options offered under the federal regulations of Title II
and Title VI.
Although owners might want to make purely rational
financial decisions, they realize that there are political
and social aspects which influence the decision. This is
especially true when dealing with subsidized housing, with
three major groups involved: the owners, the tenants and the
government.
In an ideal world of unlimited resources, where the
regulatory system is functioning as it should: 1
- Tenants will get what they need. The property will be
preserved as affordable.
" Owners will get what they have earned. The property will
be recapitalized according to formulas based on the
property's fair market value.
The government will pay the least possible amount.
Incentives will be related to the property's true value
and the tenant's true need, and the government will have a
ceiling on its obligations.
However, in the real world of limited resources, each
of the three groups gives priority to its own interests,
which often conflict the needs of the others. Conflicts
include the owner's goal of maximizing profit and the
government's goal of minimizing cost. The tenants goal is
to preserve affordability no matter what the cost. From an
economic standpoint, it would seem that owners and tenants
are aligned against the government: tenants are willing to
meet the owners asking price, but the government resists
because it wants to keep costs down.
Viewed another way, the three way relationship between
owners, tenants and government can be perceived as a series
of checks and balances. Hypothetically, unlimited federal
I Smith, David A. "Subsidized Housing Preservation: Where It Came From, Where
It's Going", Real Estate Finance, Fall 1990, Vol. 7, No 3, page 20.
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funds would create unlimited upside potential in property
values for owners, and the preservation (or creation) of an
unlimited number of affordable units for tenants. But in
reality, government funds are limited and resources must be
maximized, tenants want to preserve their homes, and owners
want to maximize profitability.
This relationship among tenants (sometimes represented
by community groups), government (federal, state and local)
and owners (individual and partnerships) requires that each
participant be sensitive to the others. Owners must
understand the needs and goals of the tenants and the
government. Conversely, it is equally important that
government and tenants comprehend the motivations and
perspectives of the private owners.
A traditional view of tenant/landlord relationships
would lead to the conclusion that tenants actions will react
to choices made by owners: If the owner decides to do
nothing, and keep the project as it is, there is little
tenants can do to change the impact of that decision. If
the owner decides to sell the project, tenants can become
actively involved, as a reaction to a landlord's decision.
And if an owner decides to refinance the project, tenants
are not impacted.
However, when public subsidy is added to the equation,
the landlord/tenant relationship becomes a triangle among
the owner, the tenant and the government. Tenants gain new
stature in determining the fate of the project. Through the
enactment of Title II and Title VI, tenant advocates have
had a pro-active influence on the process by restricting the
parameters of the three options available to the owners.
Both ELIHPA and LIHPHRA will be discussed in more detail
later, but in essence the two acts provide owners with
incentives that primarily encourage (a) sale to a non-profit
organization, or (b) refinancing of the property with
additional subsidies. The latter choice preserves the
affordable use restrictions for at least 20 years (Title II)
and possibly 50 years (Title VI). A sale to a recognized
non-profit would make the affordability permanent.
This thesis deals with how the theory of prepayment
restrictions gets played out in the real world and looks at
that game from the owner's perspective. This study is
organized as follows: the remainder of Chapter I provides a
framework for analyzing the case studies: (1) overview of
the stock of expiring use properties, (2) explanation and
comparison of the regulations that were enacted, (3) a
theoretical evaluation of owner interests and options to
hold, sell or refinance. The next three chapters present
and analyze the decision making processes of three different
owners to see how "theory" gets played out in practice. The
concluding chapter will use the case material, supporting
literature, and the perspectives of financial and legal
advisors experienced with the expiring use issue to analyze
how and why owners are motivated to make the particular
decisions they do along the route to choosing among the
three options. Final recommendations and observations about
the process of selling or refinancing expiring use
properties will conclude the report.
The following takes a look at the extent of private
investment in expiring use properties:
OVERVIEW OF STOCK
The private sector is involved in a much greater
percentage of the low income housing market than many people
realize. There are more than 4 million U.S. households
which receive rental assistance, in one form or another,
from the federal government. However, publicly owned
housing accounts for only one-third of these units. The
majority involve a partnership with the private housing
market.2
During the 1980's programs to develop or maintain
affordable housing were curtailed or eliminated. Changes in
tax laws also eliminated many of the advantages of investing
in low income housing. Had the federal government continued
to encourage investment in low income housing an "emergency"
would not have developed, for new production would have
2 Jagger, John Raymond, "A Financial Analysis of the Effect of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987 on Privately Owned But Federally Subsidized
Housing Projects Otherwise Eligible for Mortgage Prepayment", Thesis Requirement for
Degree of Master of Science in Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, August, 1988, page 5.
exceeded the small portion of low income housing stock
leaving the program each year.'
A government report in 1988 acknowledged the limited
success of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 4 to fill the
void left by the removal of tax incentives in stimulating
investment in subsidized housing. The report quotes one
owner of a low income property who commented (before the
official enactment of prepayment restrictions):
... our situation can be stated quite simply.
Congress originally used the tax laws to attract
many like me into low income housing ventures. We
would not have been at all interested without the
tax advantages, and the knowledge that we could,
at the end of 20 years, convert to some form of
market rate housing.
The recent elimination of tax advantages [for
low-income investors] has, for us at least,
guaranteed its conversion. Congress would have to
do something pretty spectacular to again make
owning and managing such ventures attractive to
anyone.5
What Congress did was to restrict the prepayment on
expiring use properties. The focus is on preserving the
existing stock of affordable housing by offering incentives
to the owners.
3 Smith, David A. "The Problem That Won't Go Away: Subsidized Housing
Preservation Three Years Later", Real Estate Review, Fall 1990, page 18.
4 Hills, Carla A. and Reuss, Henry S. "Preventing the Disappearance of Low
Income Housing", The Report of the National Low Income Housing Preservation
Commission to the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development and
the Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Congress, 1988,
p 3.
5 Hills, p 3.
ELIHPA (Title II) LIHPRHA (Title VI) & CURRENT OWNER OPTIONS
The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act
(ELIHPA, also referred to as Title II) was passed by
Congress in 1987, authorizing the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), to use existing subsidies such as
rent supplements and rehabilitation loans to deter owners
from prepaying. In 1990, the Low Income Housing
Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA, or
Title VI) was enacted, making the emergency measures
permanent. Title VI also included several revisions, most
notably, time involved to process the request and extension
of the low income use for at least another 50 years.
LIHPHRA emphasizes sale to nonprofit organizations or
to those who agree to maintain the properties as low and
moderate income properties. In addition, the act provides
for tests that (1) limit the amount current owners may
receive in incentives (the federal cost limits test), and
(2) provide a basis for denying incentives where market
conditions do not justify them (the windfall profits test).6
An owner's choice of processing under Title II requires
that the "Project must have a better and higher use than as
assisted low and moderate income housing". 7  Processing
6 "Rental Housing: Implementing the New Federal Incentives to Deter
Prepayments of HUD Mortgages", Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing
and Community Development, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
House of Representatives, April 1991, United States General Accounting Office, p 8.
7 Johnson, Sara E. "Overview of Federal Preservation Statutes", National Housing
Trust, April 15, 1992, pp 2-3.
under Title VI requires only that the "Project must have
some preservation equity (value above the existing debt) to
qualify for Title VI incentives". Owners who filed Title
II Plans of Action prior to October 11, 1990 can switch to
Title VI processing. Certain other owners (transition rule
projects) have the right to process under Title II in the
future.
The decision making process becomes more complex upon
examination of the various options available under the old
law (Title II) and the new law (Title VI). David Smith has
provided a comparative chart showing the major differences
between ELIHPA and LIHPHRA.
8
Johnson, pp 2-3.
ECONOMIC COMPARISON
Comparison of Key Economic Features
Between the Old Law and the New Law
Under the Old Law
(E L I H P A) Under the New Law(L I H P R H A)
FEATURES THAT FAVOR THE NEW LAW
Section 8 provided to
which tenants?
New rents set at what
level?
Ceiling on Section 8
rents on refinancing?
Owner able to realize
value higher than
residential rental?
How soon can an owner
start the process?
Higher loan-to-equity
ratios for sales to
non-profits?
Generally only those
at or below 50% of
median income (not 50-80!
Section 8 certificates
or 30% of tenant income
Unspecified, but
usually limited to
100% of existing FMR's
Effectively not (rent
stream is fixed by
availability of
subsidy, not value)
12 months before the
prepayment date
Everyone under 80% of
area median income
%)
"Preservation Rent"
which is a function of
fair market value
120% of existing FMR's
for area, or of
submarket if necessary
Yes, if the owner sells
24 months before the
prepayment date
Yes, up to 95%
FEATURES THAT FAVOR THE OLD LAW
Maximum loan-to-equity
ratio for Section 241(f)
equity takeout loans?
Method of figuring
future rent increases?
Future restrictions on
cash flow?
Yield on Preservation
Equity?
New lock-in period?
Annual Adjustment
Factor (so cash flow
may rise)
Whatever's left from
new rent stream
Remaining term of the
original mortgage (+/-
20 years)
Building-block cost-
driven approach (so
cash flow won't rise)
Generally limited to
8% Preservation Yield
Fixed at 8%
Remaining useful life
of the housing (at
least 50 years)
Source: David A. Smith, Recapitalization Advisors, Boston,MA
Component
90% 70%
OLD LAW v.- NEW LAW 19-Jul-91 .
The Magnitude of the Problem: the GAO Report
Before the prepayment regulations were instituted in
1988, attempts were made to estimate the extent of likely
prepayments on a national basis. The United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report during 1989 on the
likelihood that owners of subsidized housing stock would
seek prepayment of their HUD mortgages. 9 GAO found general
agreement in four studies that an estimated inventory of
600,000 units had a maximum of 367,000 units eligible for
prepayment. However, the number of units that probably
would be lost through prepayment varied from 154,000 to
243,000 units. Although it was unclear if the same measures
could be used for estimating the likely demand for
assistance under the new incentives [i.e. Title VI], GAO
believed it was a reasonable assumption that most owners
would now seek preservation incentives. In other words, the
study concluded that most owners were more likely to
refinance with additional subsidies to support the
additional debt or sell to a recognized non-profit group,
than to do nothing or try to convert the property to market.
U. S. General Accounting Office, Rental Housing: Implementing the New
Federal Incentives to Deter Prepayments of HUD Mortgages , April 1991.
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Section 8
ExistingNouchers
813,000 /
Exhibit 1-3
Composition of Subsidized Housing
Universe of Subsidized Housing
Public Housing
>,1,400,000
Privately Owned,
Subsidized Housing
1,950,000
Privately Owned, Subsidized Housing
Preservation
Analysis Inventory
645,000
Section 8 New/Rehab
- 840,000
Preservation Analysis Inventory
221(d)(3) BMIR
159,000 "
Assisted 221 (d)(3)
Market Rate
80,000
Section 236 Program
406,000
Source: National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission Tabulations. HUD Data.
Other
165,000
FmHA 515
305,000
The National Low Income Housing Preservation
Commission" developed a model to try to predict whether
owners would seek to prepay. But the exclusion of
noneconomic variables (personal, political and social) that
could affect owners decisions severely limited the model's
usefulness. Also, inaccuracies in HUD databases, including
actual errors about the properties, and a lack of
information on the physical and financial conditions of the
properties, made it difficult to estimate the ultimate cost
of deterring prepayments. If costs were higher than
expected, the subsidy funds could be drained.
Today, in a soft real estate market, owners are
probably even more concerned about the availability of
federal subsidies; owners are maintaining an attitude of
"act now" to take advantage of the subsidy programs.
In both strong and weak markets, GAO found that owners
had similar reasons for investing or not investing in
subsidized housing. The primary reasons owners gave for
investing were the financial benefits of a low interest
federally insured mortgage, tax benefits, and the
public-spirited or charitable desire to help provide housing
for low income families. In addition, owners invested to
make a profit".
10 The National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission is a private concern
financially supported by the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships and the Ford
Foundation. The study cited by GAO is "Preventing the Disappearance of Low Income
Housing", Washington, D.C. 1988.
"1 U.S. GAO p.31
At the time of the GAO survey, owners in the Boston and
Los Angeles markets wished to prepay their mortgages or sell
to take advantage of built up equity. Conversely, owners in
weak real estate markets like Houston and Denver did not
intend to prepay or sell to convert the properties to market
rate rentals.
But the perception has changed: research for this
thesis identified one Boston based owner" who insisted that
because there are about 30,000 subsidized units in the
Boston area, it was unrealistic to ever believe that most or
all of these units would convert to market rate. Another
owner, involved in limited partnerships which own 4,500
units in 25 subsidized buildings, said owners are committed
to keeping the buildings affordable. "I don't know an owner
in the state that owns a subsidized building and plans to
prepay the mortgage and kick the tenants out"." A cynic
might point out that this altruism on the part of owners
could very well be due to the fact that conversion of the
units to market rate is extremely difficult under current
regulations.
The GAO pointed out several reasons owners in high
demand, low supply markets like Los Angeles and Boston might
want to prepay: (1) the built up value of the properties
made selling attractive; (2) the earnings limit of 6% on the
12 Interview: William Stetson, SVP, Beacon Property Management, July 6, 1992
13 Sit, Mary, "Preserving Affordable Housing Law Gives Landlords Incentives But
May Have Loopholes", Boston Globe, February 3, 1991, p A47.
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original investment under the HUD programs was much lower
than the market return -would be; and (3) fears of
legislative action to "change the rules" discouraged
continued participation in the program. Conversely, low
demand, high supply areas like Denver and Houston did not
plan to prepay because: (1) declining values eliminated any
equity; (2) subsidies which were obtained from related HUD
programs provided a steady source of income and helped to
maintain low vacancy rates.
The following is a more detailed discussion of GAO
findings:
1.INCREASED MARKET VALUE OF PROPERTIES
[Prior to ELIHPA] owners planned to prepay mortgages to
gain access to increased property values or built up equity.
After prepayment, owners could sell the properties, take out
equity loans, or convert their properties to higher market
uses". In Boston, the increased values of properties
averaged 400% over a 20 year period". The increased market
value was so great that including the costs of renovations
and upgrades, conversion was still justified.
2. LIMITED RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Some owners complained to GAO that the contractual
obligation with HUD limited the rate of return to 6% on
original investment. These owners were also being taxed on
income which they did not receive. This so called "phantom
"4 U. S. GAO p.32
15 U.S. GAO p.31
income" was due to the fact that these older mortgages had
exhausted allowable depreciation. Therefore, they were
unable to offset rental income in excess of the amounts they
were permitted to retain under the limited dividend
provisions. The excess income had to be placed in a reserve
account".
3. LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT
Many owners told GAO that they would not invest in
subsidized housing because of the uncertain legislative
environment [at the time of Title II]. Congress, through
ELIHPA, had removed the owner's contractual right to prepay
their HUD insured mortgage. One owner indicated that
because of this precedent, it would be very difficult to
find new private investors for low and moderate income
housing.
4. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST PREPAYMENTS
Local political restrictions and concern for tenants
facing displacement were cited as reasons why owners would
not choose to prepay. One owner in Massachusetts, concerned
about future business in the state, chose to sell to a
nonprofit organization below the appraised value rather than
prepay the mortgages and convert the properties. GAO also
noted that any owner choosing to prepay incurred the greater
market risks inherent in a competitive rental market. There
was a potential for higher vacancies when subsidies were
16 U.S. GAO p.31
lost as well as fluctuations in local housing market
conditions.
5. INCENTIVES THAT MIGHT DETER PREPAYMENT
Owners listed a variety of incentives necessary to
induce continued ownership of low-and moderate-income
housing. These included a rate of return greater than the
6% limit, rent increases to market levels and additional
subsidies such as Section 8 LMSA payments (based on the
difference between tenant income and fair market rents).
Equity take-out loans would be effective in discouraging
mortgage prepayments, because capital gains liability is
deferred. However the interest on these loans is not
necessarily tax deductible. Increased cash flow to meet
debt service would be necessary through rent increases and
additional federal subsidies.
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE OWNERS
The three basic choices available to owners of expiring
use properties include doing nothing, selling to a
non-profit or refinancing. But within these basic
categories are more specific options. Not all owners
examine all possible options. For example, an owner who
wants only to get out of subsidized housing is not going to
be concerned with retaining management contracts, tax
implications between refinance and sale, etc. Rather the
owner will be concerned with the quickest way to get out.
Other owners see a menu of five options available to them:
sale or refinance under Title II, sale or refinance under
Title VI, or do nothing and wait for possible future
changes. Unique financial and tax situations will dictate
whether they ultimately refinance or sell.
The actual financial analysis of sale verses refinance
is complicated by the fact that Title VI encourages sale to
a non-profit buyer, therefore incentives to refinance under
Title VI are not as advantageous.17  This is one reason why
owners who decide to refinance are doing so under Title II.
When an owner determines that a sale is the best
alternative, Title II is still seen as the least time
consuming process; however, an owner may still want to sell
under Title VI because the regulations allow a potentially
higher appraised value (based on the unencumbered highest
and best use of the property). The following flow chart
gives some idea of the time involved in a sale - roughly 44
months. A refinance (stay in) would take 21 months, but up
to 36 months is allocated.
17 Smith, David A. "Selling Verses Refinancing In Preservation Recapitalizations",
Recapitalization Advisors, Boston, MA, December 1990, p 2.
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THE PREPAYMENT/PRESERVATION PROCESS
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An owner would probably sift through the three primary
options (hold, sell, refinance) in the following manner:
1. Do Nothing and Wait.
Boston Financial Group notes that waiting may provide
additional information through the experiences of others.
But there is little likelihood that the incentives will
increase. There is also a risk that federal funding may
eventually run out. An owner should take advantage of
possible subsidies (by selling or refinancing) while they
are available. Attorney Howard Cohen of Mintz, Levin, et
al, agrees that the future will be unlikely to offer better
alternatives than exist now.
2. Sell the Development.
Because the property must be offered to non-profit
groups first, it is very important to anticipate the
capabilities of any potential buyer. In weighing the pros
and cons of a sale verses a refinance, Cohen wants an owner
to consider numerous factors, including:
-- Do you want to sell?
-- What are the needs of the ownership interests?
-- If you sell can you retain the management contract?
-- What are the tax consequences? The adjusted basis of the
investors, passive losses which can offset the gain from the
deal, etc., should be considered.
Because the priority purchasers have twelve months to
make a bona fide offer, David Smith of Recapitalization
Advisors points out the importance of being sure that the
buyer is capable of completing the purchase. Things to look
for in a non-profit buyer 8 include, (a) experienced housing
and management capabilities, (b) good to excellent
relationships at local, state (housing finance agency), and
federal (HUD) levels, (c) ability to communicate with
tenants, and (d) commitment to get through the long process.
An owner who chooses to sell may reconsider if no qualified
purchaser comes forward.'9
The circumstances when selling may be superior to
refinancing include:
A. An owner no longer wants to be in the business of
owning and managing affordable housing.
B. The property is worth considerably more than its
residential rental value (and processing proceeds under
LIHPHRA). For example, if the highest and best use is a
condominium, then the appraised value, and the sale price to
the non-profit buyer, will be based on the non rental use.
C. The owner will pay little or no tax upon sale due
to accumulated passive losses which can be used to offset
the gain from a sale.
D. The interest on the refinancing is non-deductible
at the individual level. If the owner does not intend to
18 Smith, p 2
19 Smith,p6
reinvest the loan proceeds, then a sale would be more
desirable.
E. The property is a resyndication with secondary
notes that mature soon, and the owner is unable to
renegotiate the notes. An owner may be forced to sell in
order to retire a secondary balloon note.
Although the potential sale price may be higher due to
the appraisal method used to value the property, Boston
Financial estimates that processing a sale under Title VI
would take two to three years longer than a similar
transaction under Title II.
3. Refinance the Development
Boston Financial believes that nationally, most
partnerships eligible for Title II incentives are choosing
this option because it affords greater benefits to both the
General and Limited Partners than the alternatives. GP's
can retain control of property management contracts and also
receive any residual proceeds from refinancing. The
Limiteds receive proceeds from the refinancing and do not
incur a current tax liability. Finally, the original 40
year note is not extended.
Howard Cohen states that "If your desire is to pull out
cash from the deal as quickly as possible, then a
refinancing is the preferred route." An owner will need to
Cohen Howard E., Flynn, Kathleen M. Sheehan Kathleen M. Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, et al. Memorandum to the Owners of Lakeview Towers, May 3, 1990.
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get HUD approval of any additional debt and incentives will
also be needed from HUD to support the new debt.
Boston Financial points out that refinancing under
Title VI includes more restrictive equity take out loan
amounts and highly regulated appraisal guidelines. This
means that only 70% of the equity can be accessed through a
take out loan; the value is based on an appraisal of the
property as rental apartments only. The use restrictions
must also be extended for an additional 50 years. Under
Title II, 90% of the equity can be accessed and there are no
restrictions on potential future cash flows. The new lock
in period would be the remaining years of the original
mortgage (see earlier exhibit, "Old vs. New Law") .
Therefore, refinancing under Title II is more desirable.
David Smith reminds owners that equity takeout loan interest
is generally deductible only by the individual, not the
entity. This has specific implications for limited
partnerships.
In a refinancing, the remaining 30% of preservation
equity that is not taken out will have an annual yield of 8%
under Title VI. This so called "preservation yield" under
Title II is not a fixed rate, but rather, is based on the
remaining income stream after debt service. Therefore,
explains David Smith of Recapitalization Advisors, it is
possible to take a smaller equity loan and receive a larger
21 Interview: David Smith, Recapitalization Advisors, Boston, Ma, June 18, 1992
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dividend over time. But because of the low yield rate (8%),
it makes better financial sense to pull out as much equity
as possible. Owners do not seem to be considering this
option.
As Recapitalization Advisors has explained to owners of
expiring use properties, "Stripped to its essentials, the
basic trade is to take out 70% of value, tax free
(refinance), or take out 100% of value, taxable (sale).
Since capital gains rates are currently 28%, 100% taxable is
equivalent to 72% tax free or better. Individual tax
situations may alter this scenario. It is important to
survey the General and Limited Partners at the outset,
because the sale or refinance is a huge capital event which
will impact the tax returns of the participants for at least
ten years"2 . Because many of these deals were tax driven,
the tax situation continues to complicate the ultimate
decision of the owner.
Similarly to Boston Financial, Recapitalization
Advisors believes that the only truly viable option, given
current regulations, is to refinance, preferably under Title
II guidelines. Smith notes that refinancing can occur six
to twelve months sooner than a sale. An owner is incapable
of quantifying whether or not a sale will actually go
through. The time delay involved with a non profit buyer is
made even more difficult by not knowing if the tenant or
22 Smith, "Selling...", p 5.
community group will be able to obtain financing and
complete the transaction. The following chart compares
selling verses refinancing under LIHPHRA guidelines.
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Exhibit 1
Selling versus Refinancing
in Preservation Recapitalizations
Point-by-Point Comparison of Factors to Consider
Note Key attribute
1. Valuation method
2. Equity takeout
loan-to-equity
3. Preservation
Yield Rate
4. Taxation of recap
proceeds
5. Lock-in tax from
capital account
6. Transaction costs
7. Property management
Sell to a
Preserving Entity
Highest and best use
95%
Reinvest at market
Taxable
as passive income
Triggered on sale
Buyer's costs may
be financed out
Continuation may not
be a condition of sale
Refinance with the
Current Owner
Highest rental
70%
Fixed at 8.0%
Tax-free but future
deductibility
complicated
Deferred
indefinitely
Seller pays
its own
Owner's option
Source:David A. Smith, Recapitalization Advisors, Boston, MA
Each of the next three chapters will describe a case
study of an expiring use property. The first case deals
with an owner who wants to get out of the subsidized housing
business. The second case deals with a limited partnership
that has decided to refinance. The third case is also a
limited partnership, but one which decided to sell to a
community group.
It is of critical importance to see how theory is
translated to real world decision making. By examining the
reasons why owners choose one of the three basic options, it
is possible to see the actual impact of current regulations
on the decision making process. It will also be possible to
see how owners juggle the different roles - property
manager, general partner, local developer - and how these
roles also influence the choice to hold sell or refinance
the property.
CHAPTER TWO
CASTLE SQUARE: .A TRIANGULATED SALE
INTRODUCTION
The sale of the Castle Square housing project involved
an owner whose primary motivation in selling was to get out
of the subsidized housing business. This contrasts sharply
with one of the buyers, a private management company with
experience in low income housing, that wanted to get
involved. Ultimately, the seller, the private management
company and the residents perceived the tenant buyer group
as the ones who came out ahead. The tenants organization
hailed the sale as a long awaited victory for the project
residents.
This deal does not come anywhere near the ideal of
owner, tenant and government discussed in the introduction.
Nor does the transaction fit neatly into an analysis of the
three options: hold, sell or refinance the property.
Ideally, the owner will seek the alternative that generates
the best return, tenants will preserve housing and the
government will minimize costs. But with Castle Square, the
owner wanted out, the residents wanted retribution and the
government (local and federal) stalled the process.
It should not be too surprising that the tenants
ultimately were able to negotiate numerous concessions.
LeBlanc, Steven. "Looking Forward To A Done Deal." South End News, June 25-July 1,
1992, Vol 13, No. 21, p. 1
The owner of Castle Square focused on selling the project as
the way to get out of the subsidized housing business.
Therefore, the tone of the negotiations was to do anything
to get the deal through. The tenants were empowered with
more leverage through the support of municipal and social
organizations.
The seller viewed himself as a victim, subjected to the
demands of tenants, federal and local agencies. Among the
major issues which frustrated the seller were the five years
of time involved, the owner's political impotence and
radical tenant advocates who encouraged the tenants to make
progressively more demands.
on the other hand, the principal of a private
management company, experienced with subsidized housing,
perceived he could get through the regulatory process and
acquire the property in order to resyndicate. Ultimately,
he was impressed by the savvy of the tenants, who used him
to the fullest, taking advantage of his management
expertise, credit reputation and personal finances.
Educationally, the buyer would do the transaction again.
Financially, he would not get involved. If the sale process
backfired like this all the time, there would be no private
capital willing to commit to subsidized housing. Then the
question becomes: Was Castle Square really a "victory for
tenants"?
BACKGROUND
Located at the neighborhood borders of Chinatown and
the South End, the Castle Square housing project consists of
500 apartment units, first floor commercial space, an A&P
grocery store and a 400 car parking garage. The
development's owner, the Druker Company, constructed the
property in the mid 1960's and managed the on-going property
operations. Castle Square had been financed through the
Section 221(d)3 program and was subject to rent restrictions
in exchange for a low interest mortgage.
In 1987, Druker began the process of selling the
property to a limited partnership controlled by Winn
Development Company. The original sale price was set at $21
million. However, the signed deal stipulated that the
parking garage and food store remain in the name of Druker.
Because of this issue, everything about the sale would
eventually change - the sale price, the purchasers and the
time involved to actually complete the transaction.
After hearing about the impending sale, Castle Square
tenants, concerned about possible rent increases or
eviction, became involved. Eventually the Castle Square
Tenants Organization (CSTO) became partners with Winn and a
syndication as the third partner. CSTO identified a number
of issues which had to be resolved before they would agree
to the proposed sale: long term affordability, funding for
an eventual tenant buyback of Castle Square, the tenant
management role, an acceptable rehabilitation plan and
operating budget, a source of technical assistance funds,
the disposition of the parking garage, the continuation of
the A&P food store, and the financial contribution of the
seller to CSTO's preservation effort."
Negotiations involving the parking garage were further
muddled by legal questions. The owner had been leasing the
parking to Tufts University. Druker wanted to retain the
garage for future redevelopment. But the tenants, who for
ten years had not been aware of their rights to use the
garage, suddenly had this resource to use as leverage in the
negotiations. After years of impasse, where neither the
tenants nor Druker would relinquish claims to the parking,
the tenants finally gained control of 150 parking spaces, in
exchange for Druker's right to future redevelopment of the
garage.
According to O'Donnell, the delays resulted in the sale
becoming entwined in the prepayment regulatory process. The
sale was further affected by the timing of reported HUD
scandals, which brought to a virtual standstill the
processing of Castle Square. In May 1990, a Project
Agreement was executed among CSTO, Winn and Druker, and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) voted the approvals
which were needed to resolve the zoning and land use issues
24 Achtenberg, Emily P. "Preserving Expiring Use Restriction Projects in
Massachusetts: A Handbook for Tenant Advocates, Community Groups and Public
Officials", Interim Edition, Jan 25, 1991, p. CSQ 3.
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under its jurisdiction.2 s
The limited partnership that was created, Trebhershaw
consists of Winn and CSTO as general partners and a
syndication, using Low Income Housing Tax Credits, as the
limited partner. Winn's general partnership ownership will
be phased out over the next 5 to 10 years, but the
management contract will continue for 15 years. The
syndication will be paid off after 15 years, and CSTO will
become the sole owner of the development.
By the time the sale occurred in June 1992, the list of
participants looked something like this:
DEVELOPMENT TEAM
Tenant Partner:
Developer Partner:
Tenant Consultants:
Attorneys
Rehabilitation:
Financing:
Property Management:
Castle Square Tenants
Organization
Deborah Backus, Juandamarie
Brown, Co-CEOs
Winn Development Company
Arthur Winn, President
J. Ralph Cole, Hollingsworth
B. Wiedemann, Principals
Chia-Ming Sze, Architect;
CEDAC (Vincent F. O'Donnell),
Financial and Regulatory
Analysis;
CTAC (William Traynor and
Lizbeth Hyer, organizational
development);
Boston Affordable Housing
Coalition (Michael Kane),
Development Strategy); and
Hezekiah Pratt and
Associates, Architect
Greater Boston Legal Services,
Jay Rose (CSTO);
Brown, Rudnick Freed & Gesmer,
Daniel Sullivan, Jeffrey
Sacks & Josephine McNeil
(CSTO);
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, Howard Cohen &
Kathleen Sheehan (Winn)
LEA Associates and Haven
Associates, Architects &
Engineers;
Wolf Construction
Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, with FNMA Credit
Enhancement
Winn Management Company
25 Achtenberg, p. CSQ 2
DEAL STRUCTURE
In addition to the $17 million acquisition cost of
Castle Square, federal and state financing of $16.5 million
will be used to update apartments and the exterior. Total
funding sources, including equity contributions by Winn and
the future limited partners, is in excess of $52 million.
During the five years of negotiations, four separate
government agencies had to okay the sale, including HUD, the
BRA, EOCD, and MHFA.26 According to Vincent O'Donnell2 7 ,
Director of Development for Massachusetts Community Economic
Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC), the tenant's
organization will pay Druker over $17 million for the
property. Approximately $1.2 million of the sale proceeds
will be kept in reserve for operating expenses. Financing
includes:
- $25.3 million mortgage from MHFA
- $5.4 million rehabilitation (flexible subsidy) loan from
HUD
- $5.4 million existing 221(d)3 mortgage
- $2 million energy related loan from EOCD
- $2 million BRA site loan (infrastructure improvements)
- $8.3 million from the third partner
26 Leblanc, p.1
27 Leblanc, p. 4
Tenants and Winn will be co-general partners for 5 to 7
years. Winn will continue as the management company for the
next 15 years, gradually relinquishing control to the tenant
group. An important aspect of this deal which has not yet
been fully resolved is the unidentified third limited
partner. Winn intends to syndicate the 15 year deal using
Low Income Housing Tax Credits. But O'Donnell points out
that the equity interest is being marketed at a time when it
is difficult to interest investors in troubled inner city
projects . As a result, guarantees to the limited
partners, buyout provisions and equity payment schedules
continue to be negotiated.
Winn does not think that the syndication should be
particularly difficult 9 . Because Winn is committed to
managing the property for the 15 years that the syndication
exists, risk will be minimized. The limited partners will
not be making money FROM the deal, but rather will be
looking for a tax shelter. Therefore, according to Winn,
the real risk to the limiteds is possible foreclosure, which
would create a taxable event for the limiteds. Because he
has never missed a mortgage payment on other projects, Winn
argues that the limiteds should feel comfortable with the
deal.
CSTO has a purchase money fund to ensure the viability
of a tenant buy back of the limited partners' interests,
28 Interview: Vincent O' Donnell, Director of Development, CEDAC, July 10, 1992
29 Interview: Arthur Winn, Winn Management Company, July 13, 1992
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after the tax credit benefits have been exhausted in
approximately fifteen years3. HUD's subsidy layering
guidelines limit the tenant fund to 10% of the gross
syndication proceeds, roughly $830,000.31 A subsidy
layering analysis must be done to insure that there is not
an excess of subsidized funds in conjunction with tax
credits. Because it is difficult to forecast future finance
terms and expense trends, Winn ended up setting aside an
additional $1.5 million from the net syndication proceeds.
These additional funds will be invested so that the amount
will grow over time in order to cover the anticipated $5.8
million cost of the investor buyout.
OWNER OPTIONS
Although the owner had three basic options available to
him, the primary focus was on selling. An owner's
representative states that the company did explore possible
alternatives, such as holding the property as is or
refinancing. But the owners, along with the other players,
knew that the true motivation was to sell and get out.
It is also important to remember that the initial
decision to sell preceded the regulatory environment of
ELIHPA and LIHPHRA. Although the available incentives did
not cause the owner to rationally select the best available
30 O'Donnell, Vincent, "Case Study: Castle Square, Boston, MA", CEDAC, July 7,
1992, p4, Revised.
31 O'Donnell, p 5.
alternative, the restrictions probably reinforced the
decision to get out. By looking at the transaction through
the lens of the owner (wanting to get out) and through the
lens of the buyer (the management company wanting to get
in), it will be possible to see what could have been done
differently to make the sale as beneficial to the owners as
it was to the tenants.
SELLER PERSPECTIVE
The Druker Company had decided to sell Castle Square
because subsidized housing was not their area of expertise
and they "wanted to get out", according to a company
representative." His description of the five year process:
horrendous, confusing, annoying, mystifying, interminable
delays. The spokesman was particularly embittered by the
length of time involved to sell the project. He cited two
primary reasons. The first reason was the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA), which did not fairly "weigh
both sides". The second reason was radical tenant advocates
"who would have been happy if no deal had been done - they
were not serving the interests of the tenants". Endless
delays and negotiations, as well as the leverage of the
tenants through the BRA by with holding the necessary
approvals, meant that the seller was forced to give even
more concessions before it finally ended.
32 Interview: The Druker Company, July 7, 1992
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The Druker Company views itself as a victim, having
been caught in the midst of -regulatory instability - ELIHPA
and HUD's subsidy overlay review process which added
substantially more time to the whole process. The seller's
motivation was more personal than financial - get out of
subsidized housing. Yet the process became very
politicized. The Druker respects the tenants for looking
out for their own best interest, but is angry at aggressive
individuals who seemed to have antagonism as their primary
agenda. In retrospect, the Druker Company believes that the
seller should be allowed greater control over the process,
and the process should be streamlined for speed and
simplicity.
While everybody involved in the sale may share
responsibility for the delays and confrontations over the
past five years, it is helpful to look at what Druker might
have done differently to avoid a cumbersome and time
consuming process. (1) If the tenants had been more
involved from the start, antagonism might have been
diminished. (2) Druker could have tried to improve
maintenance of the property, causing the tenants to be less
adversarial, and possibly resulting in a higher sale price
for the property. (3) Increased negotiating leverage might
have been obtained by deciding to leave the property as it
is, or refinancing, which would have greatly diminished the
influence of the tenants. These alternatives are discussed
in more detail:
1. The Druker spokesman acknowledges that the seller
did not initially believe there would be a problem with the
tenants - there was no formal tenant organization. The
seller underestimated the degree to which the original
discussions would activate outside tenant advocates. The
result of this oversight was an organized response to the
proposed sale by the residents. According to the Druker
representative, as negotiations progressed, it seemed that
tenant demands escalated over time. The seller kept giving
more and more concessions. When the sale finally did occur,
the tenants insisted that Druker make a financial
contribution to the sale, "a form of retribution for years
of mismanagement," according to Vincent O'Donnell. The
tenants even insisted that Ron Druker personally sign the
check.
The owner's apathy toward the tenants contrasts with
Winn. He told the tenants, without being patronizing, that
he would maintain the affordability of the apartments,
insist on making a profit and manage the building well.
2. An increase in the value of the property could have
been possible with more conscientious property management.
Winn has no doubt that Druker could have been an excellent
property manager. However, Druker was simply not committed
to subsidized housing; he was "not in the business".
Therefore, it was very easy to portray the developer of the
elite Heritage on the Common as the bad guy and the villain.
But Ron Druker didn't get any credit for keeping the rents
low. In terms of value, the tenants at Castle Square got
what they paid for: rents roughly half of what they should
have been, and a property that reflected those rents. "Ron
did a wonderful job of delivering a level of product
comparable to the rents". The Druker spokesman also points
out that if the seller were to invest time and money into
improving the property, it would have meant hiring outside
experts familiar with requesting additional subsidies. The
owner thought that by selling the property to Winn, a
recognized expert in subsidized housing, the need for
outside consultants could have been avoided.
3. Druker, not wishing to deal with the tenants, and
focusing strictly on getting out of subsidized housing,
apparently had the impression that he had minimal control
over the sale process. But if he had threatened to stop the
sale and leave the project as is, the tenants may have
become more anxious to get rid of him and thus would have
insisted on fewer concessions in order to get the deal
finished. If Druker had threatened to refinance and hire
Winn as the full time management company, the tenants would
not now be co-owners of the property. Instead, the seller
threatened to proceed under Title VI, which being a more
regulated process is hardly a threat.
Perhaps the lesson is that when an owner becomes locked
into a single mind set, the inflexibility eliminates
creative solutions or alternatives. The seller was so
strongly motivated to get rid of the property, he actually
ended up paying the price for it.
Because the history of the sale spans a time interval
beginning before the first federal preservation law (ELIHPA)
and continuing after the permanent law was passed, the
seller's mentality might also have been influenced by an
unstable regulatory environment which only encouraged the
owner to want to get out when he could.
THE BUYER
The anticipated syndication of the Castle Square deal
is particularly interesting because it was the prime reason
for Winn's interest in acquiring the property. The buyer
anticipated collecting substantial syndication fees.
Management contracts were a secondary consideration. Yet
because of the way the deal evolved over time and the actual
amount of cash which Winn had to put into the deal, "If all
goes according to plan, I will be making 65 cents an hour.
It was a sickening realization. Vince O'Donnell calculated
that my internal rate of return was even lower than the
limiteds! Of course, that is if all goes well and I can
actually pull out my syndication fee".
Winn stated that from a business perspective, he would
not repeat the process of trying to purchase Castle Square:
there was no economic justification. However, he stated
philosophically that from a 'life experience' stand point he
would do it again. Winn has great respect for professionals
at CEDAC and Legal Services who have made a life choice of
social commitment; he considers them friends today. Winn
also has tremendous admiration for the tenants, who rapidly
became quite sophisticated. "They knew all we knew simply
by asking". Winn is an experienced professional, yet here
were a group of tenants, able to "use him to get everything
they wanted". This included Winn's management expertise,
syndication credibility, and personal financial commitment.
Winn differs from Druker largely in the way he deals
with tenants. While Druker did not consult with the
residents, Winn was straight forward with them from the
beginning. He told them:
I want to make as much money as possible and
I want to do an excellent job of managing this
property. Tenants can accept and understand
that. Once they understood my need for
profitability, they actually became advocates for
me against HUD upon discovering that my
syndication fee was being reduced to 30% of what
it was originally.
As a new (partial) owner of Castle Square, Winn's
management technique is unlike Druker. The new part owner
will make sure the project is managed well and the tenants
are happy because he believes that a well managed
development is the key to a financially successful project.
It is not because Winn believes that he can do a better job
than Druker, rather it is because he wants to do a better
job. Winn points out that Druker is very successful in
developing high end residential and commercial projects.
But after inheriting the troubled Castle Square property,
Druker made a business decision that he would not invest the
time in turning around this project; rather, he would focus
on his area of expertise.
Although the new owner has learned a lot over the past
five years, Winn argues he could have built four hotels in
the time it took for the Castle Square transaction. In
particular, Winn's confrontations with HUD made the deal "an
economic absurdity". Winn feels that HUD was more concerned
about his fee than any other aspect of the deal. Winn is
particularly critical of subsidy layering. HUD not only
questioned the adequacy of the proposed owner's contribution
to match Flexible Subsidy funds, but also questioned the
income and rent limits which will apply to the Section 8
Loan Management subsidies and various mortgage documentation
issues.
However, it also appears that HUD was concerned with
the question of whether CSTO is truly an independent partner
in the project, and whether the distribution of financial
benefits between CSTO, Winn and Druker justifies treating
the proposed sale as a form of tenant ownership." The
tenants finally convinced HUD.
Castle Square is an example of a subsidized housing
transaction that severely derailed. The motivation of the
owner was probably too clear, and not readily open to
revision. The tenants became sophisticated very quickly and
were able to manipulate not only the seller, but to take
advantage of the partial buyer as well. While these
internal conflicts were going on between owner and tenants,
external impacts of increased government regulation added
more conflict. Rather than directing the owners motivation
to sell with incentives, government restrictions added
another layer of regulation (i.e. dispute over Winn's
syndication fee). Druker's perception of himself as victim
merely encouraged the backfiring of the process. The next
two cases will show that a more methodical approach by
owners to the expiring use prepayment issue can result in a
less frazzled process.
O'Donnell, p 3.
CHAPTER THREE
GEORGETOWNE HOUSE I & II: COMPLEXITIES OF REFINANCING
INTRODUCTION
after looking at the options available to them, the
partners of the syndication which owns this subsidized
housing project have decided to refinance. How the owners
made this decision is helpful in understanding what
motivates an owner to refinance instead of sell. The
methodology used in arriving at the decision to "stay in"
was made easier by the fact that there is substantial equity
in the project beyond the HUD mortgage and secondary notes.
A general partner, the Beacon Company, has dealt confidently
with government agencies in the past and feels that they can
continue to do so in the future.
The re-syndication of the property in the early 1980's
which added another level of complexity to the refinancing
process. Because all of the ownership interests agree that
refinancing is the best alternative available, it was
necessary for the investors, general partners and
noteholders to compromise in order to make the deal work.
Beacon, as general partner and property manager, found
itself acting as the middle man between tenants and the
government, and between the -limited partners and second note
holders. The refinance Plan of Action is still in process,
with information currently being disseminated to the
tenants. Because Beacon has maintained a good relationship
with the tenants in the past, and are not converting the
units to conventional housing, they do not anticipate
insurmountable opposition from residents concerned about
rent increases.
BACKGROUND
These two contiguous housing projects, containing a
total of 967 apartments, were constructed in 1970 - 1971 for
low and moderate income households. Financed under the
rental housing program authorized by Section 221 (d) (3) of
the National Housing Act, the owners had the right to
prepay the mortgage after 20 years (Georgetowne I on May 1,
1990 and Georgetowne II on December 10, 1991), thus ending
any use and occupancy restrictions. However, during the
1980's, changes in tax laws, ownership and federal
prepayment restrictions created a new, more complex set of
relationships between the investors and general partners,
and between the government and the limited partnership.
In 1983, acquisition of the properties occurred through
the resyndication of an existing limited partnership. The
new ownership vehicle, Beacon Georgetowne Limited
Partnership, was formed to "own the beneficial interests in,
and to operate... Georgetowne I and II"34 . The Beacon
Company, General Partner of the original limited
partnership, was also the GP of the new limited partnership.
Boston Financial Group (BFG) became a Special Limited
Partner, and a new group of investors became the Limited
Partners. Although the new limiteds contributed a
substantial amount of new investment dollars, this infusion
of capital did not completely pay off the original
partnership. Therefore a second mortgage was created with
principal and accrued interest payable at the end of the
term. The original General Partner and the original Limited
Partners became independent Note Holders. These 15 year
notes would be due at the end of 1998.
This tax driven deal was structured primarily to
restart the property depreciation schedule, which allowed
the investors to use the losses as a tax shelter to offset
other income. However, changes in the tax laws in 1986
eliminated many of the tax advantages. The losses
associated with the notes became less valuable due to
deductibility restrictions. Tax law changes now meant that
the return on the investment would have to be based on
positive cash flow from the property. Although the
resyndication had been created to take advantage of negative
34 Levanthal, Norman B. and Sidman, Edwin N. "Memorandum to the Limited
Partners of Beacon Georgetowne Limited Partnership Concerning the Proposed Plan of
Action", February 28, 1992.
cash flows, due to excessive leverage it was virtually
impossible to generate enough income to meet the debt
service. Therefore, sale of the property was one possible
option. But even if the owners had wanted to sell without
restrictions, it would have been virtually impossible: in
1987, ELIHPA put a temporary hold on mortgage prepayments.
With the enactment of the LIHPRHA, the property owners
examined the alternatives and proceeded with refinancing the
project.
DEAL STRUCTURE
Based upon renegotiations with the General Partners,
both the limiteds and the noteholders will share
proportionately in the net proceeds available for
distribution.3 5 Of the $24,000,000, a total of $18 million
would be paid to the noteholders, and $6 million would be
paid to the limited partners. The latter payment will
deliver $60,000 per investment unit, which represents 60%
of the initial capital contribution. The payment to the
noteholders represents a discount from the original
obligation. Noteholders will receive $0.70 on the dollar
and will be paid off, according to Beacon.
Because the limiteds shared in tax advantages before
and after the tax law changes, the total return for them
would be different from the noteholders. The Limiteds will
*5 Levanthal, p 4.
get back 60% of the original contribution but still remain
in the deal. If the investment continued as originally
structured, any remaining investment capital would be
consumed by interest on the second mortgage. Therefore, it
is beneficial for the limiteds to agree to the proposal.
As part of the deal being offered to the limiteds,
there is a 10% "leeway deduction". This means that investor
consent to the refinancing is based on achieving a minimum
level of net refinancing proceeds - within 10% of the
amounts projected in the memorandum. If HUD accepts without
modification the appraiser's conclusions, the equity loan
could be a larger amount, based primarily on prevailing
mortgage rates. BFG gives an example where a rate of 9.5%
would yield net proceeds of more than $30 million, of which
the Limited Partners would receive 30%, or $9 million.
Because Georgetowne I and II does have significant
preservation value, there is obviously an incentive for
those involved to take a discounted proportion rather than
ending up with nothing. The total value of the two
properties is $58.8 million, with an estimated equity loan
of at least $28 million which will be insured by HUD under
the Section 241(f) program. After lump sum capital
improvements, costs and fees, $24,000,000 will be available
to distribute to the noteholders and investors.
If the primary motivation for owners investing in
subsidized housing has been yield, then according to BFG,
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the limiteds have done well, even with the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Every dollar invested has produced in excess of $2.38
in tax deductions. Without the proposed refinancing, the
Partnership would continue to produce passive losses over
the next several years, averaging $8,000 to $10,000
annually, until 1998 when the purchase money notes are
due. With the proposed refinancing, an investor would be
returned $60,000 from the original contribution. The total
return on investment is not that different from what was
projected at the time of original syndication, according to
Peter Richardson at Boston Financial.
OPTIONS: Hold, Sell or Refinance
In consultation with BFG, the General Partners felt
that the best alternative was to refinance under Title TT
which allowed the fastest processing and the least
regulatory procedure. They arrived at this decision by
examining and then eliminating the alternatives. Both the
General Partner and Boston Financial compiled a list of the
five options which they saw available to the partnership:
- Refinance under Title II (ELIHPA)
- Sell to a nonprofit under Title II
- Refinance under Title VI (LIHPRHA)
- Sell to a nonprofit under Title VI
- Do nothing and wait
36 Levanthal, p 10
Sale of the property did not seem practical: Beacon's
perception was that there- existed very few non-profits
capable of completing a purchase of a project as large as
Georgetowne. They also cited the lengthy time frame which
would be involved, especially under Title VI. Meanwhile
interest would continue to mount on the second notes, making
a delay more expensive. Exit taxes upon sale were a further
disincentive.
Waiting was also an unlikely option for reasons cited
by BFG: Minimal economic growth was projected for the New
England region, modest appreciation in real estate values
would not create an advantage to cover accrued interest and
the deal to discount the second notes was more advantageous
today than it would be in the future. The risks of waiting
would be greater than the rewards. The GP also noted that
adverse conditions could result as the government begins
feeling the costs of the Preservation Acts in the federal
budget.17  BFG and the Beacon Company point out specific
flaws in the strategy of doing nothing and waiting:
1. Available funding through the federal government may
disappear or become even more restrictive.
owners are becoming increasingly conservative regarding
their expectation of federal funding for subsidized housing.
Beacon Company cites the federal deficit as one reason why
additional funding will not be available in the foreseeable
37 Levanthal, p 6.
future. Therefore the prevailing mentality is, "Take what
you can get when you can. get it". Reflected in this
attitude is an aversion to the uncertainty of dealing with
the government. The Feds changed the rules on prepayment
therefore they might change the rules again.
2. The second note holders are willing to negotiate now,
but will be less likely to do so in the future.
The investment rationale of "more is better sooner"
prevails. Therefore the note holders are currently willing
to take less than the face value of the notes which includes
not only principal repayment but also interest due. The
current deal discounts the second notes to a present value
based on a 6 year holding period. Waiting would result in a
shorter holding period and a lesser discount to present
value.
3. The limiteds have been reminded that if the balloon
payment to the second note holders is not paid when due in
1998, foreclosure will mean an even bigger loss to the
limiteds than in the current situation. Equally as
important, the General Partner has pointed out to the
noteholders that if they wait until 1998, there is no
guaranty that there will be "funds available to make
payments in full, or even partial payment ... since the notes
are non-recourse, you cannot seek payment from any other
source" .38
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Both a sale and a refinance would accelerate payment on
the second notes. However, the estimated preservation
equity in the project meant that the Limited Partners would
receive little or no return of their original investment.
Therefore it would be prudent for the noteholders to take a
discount and share the proceeds with the limiteds in order
for them to go along with the decision. Likewise, it would
be logical for the limiteds to agree to refinance now; in
all likelihood it is a better deal than what the limiteds
will end up with in the future.
The General Partner and Special Limited Partner
advocate refinancing under Title II. A refinance under
Title VI would mean a slower, more highly regulated process.
The attitude of the partners is to act now; the downside
risks associated with the market, i.e. minimal appreciation
in real estate values, fluctuating interest rates and
availability of federal financing, are far greater than any
upside potential. This runs parallel to BFG's attitude
toward government programs in general: take advantage of
federal programs when they first become available, otherwise
they become progressively less desirable.
The General Partners, Limited Partners and Noteholders
all agree with this advice. The partnership is following
the proposed Plan of Action, which is to refinance under
Title II. At this writing, information is being
disseminated to the tenants of Georgetowne Houses. Meetings
are also planned. William Stetson, Senior Vice President of
Beacon Management Company, -does not anticipate any strong
opposition because tenant relations have been good in the
past, the partnership is not changing the status of the
project and is not eliminating affordable units.
Under the Plan of Action, the partnership is also
seeking additional HUD subsidies in return for extending the
low income use restrictions on the property. By
implementing Section 8 subsidies, unit rents for very low
income households will be increased to levels comparable
with conventional market rents. The higher rents will
generate increased revenues, which should also boost the net
operating income, and in effect, the value of the property.
OWNER MOTIVATIONS
Beacon has generally not regretted becoming involved
in subsidized housing. When asked if they would do it again
(become involved with expiring use properties), William
Stetson stated "Definitely yes". However, the only time
that the company questioned its involvement was during the
years that ELIHPA was in force. The prepayment process was
at a standstill and Beacon had little idea of what would
happen in the future. This aversion to uncertainty was
combined with a sense of a loss of control. "There were a
lot of odd things going on - the government was broke, no
new housing was being built, and the government couldn't pay
for the existing housing". 39 ELIHPA was the only time that
Beacon was unsure if they wanted to be involved - there were
too many unanswered questions about the process, and no
realistic option for the company to get out.
Beacon, although uncertain of how the government would
eventually deal with ELIHPA, felt that they still had a
secure negotiating position. There was no new affordable
housing being built, therefore the government had to be
willing to work with the owners of expiring use properties
to maintain the stock of affordable apartments. During the
mid 1980's, because of the real estate market boom, there
was a stronger incentive for owners to fight for their
rights. With the enactment of permanent regulations under
LIHPRHA, owners like Beacon felt that a degree of certainty
had been restored.
Stetson believes that tenant advocates realized they
were "losing the battle" regarding expiring use, and that
the landlords would inevitably get incentives to stay in.
Time was the major factor which tenants were able to
institute into Title VI in an effort to intimidate owners
from changing the status of the properties. Sale or
refinance are now more bureaucracy intensive, but at least
owners know what the process will be an element of
uncertainty has been eliminated.
39 Interview: William Stetson, SVP, Beacon Management Company, July 6, 1992.
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Beacon viewed itself as the middle man between a
variety of groups. Not only did they have to deal with
Limited Partners and Noteholders on the one hand, Beacon had
to deal with the federal government (HUD) and tenant groups
on the other. Beacon felt a responsibility to achieve the
best alternative for each of these groups. The various
ownership roles of developer, property manager, etc. will be
explored further.
Maintaining the project as affordable was important
politically, because Beacon has such a prominent role in
local development. Beacon placed a priority on an excellent
reputation; therefore the company would never want to be
seen as the bad guy evicting tenants in order to convert
housing to market rate condominiums. Stetson pointed out
that had such a situation occurred, the development of Rowes
Wharf would have been a political impossibility.
It is conceivable that while it might not have been in
the best interest of Beacon to convert, it might have been
desirable from the Limited Partners viewpoint to proceed
with a conversion. This hypothetical conflict between the
GP and the LP's was never more than imaginary, because
market conditions did not justify converting the units.
Conversion of Georgetowne to market rate units was not
only politically incomprehensible, it was unrealistic from a
practical viewpoint as well. Beacon realized during the
late 1980's that if all the expiring use properties in
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Massachusetts were converted to market rate, then roughly
30,000 units, primarily in the Boston area, would flood the
market. The company felt that there was no way this supply
could be absorbed - besides the fact that there would be
30,000 households out on the street. Therefore, even before
ELIHPA, Beacon intuitively did not see any financial
justification for paying to remove all the existing tenants
and pay for the costs to convert Georgetowne Houses, and
then have the project sit vacant.
Another aspect of this particular deal which could have
affected the decision making process was debt forgiveness
which had tax consequences for both the noteholders and the
limited partners. Because the purchase money notes would be
retired at a discount, the IRS may consider this a taxable
event. Discounting would require forgiveness of a portion
of the principal and the accrued, but unpaid interest.
Some of this purchase money debt reduction would generate
passive income to the Limited Partners. Tax impacts will be
different depending on whether principal or interest is
forgiven. In brief, principal forgiveness favors the note
holders while interest forgiveness favors the Limited
Partners. The partnership resolved this issue by agreeing
that any debt forgiveness would be split proportionally
between principal and interest.
Although the tax law changes were not in the control of
Beacon, the company nonetheless felt a fiduciary
responsibility to seek the best financial alternative for
investors and noteholders. While company reputation is part
of the reason, there were also the benefits to the General
Partners, 41% owned by Beacon. But there is no reason why
the motivations have to be mutually exclusive: the limiteds
and noteholders agree with BFG and Beacon (unanimous support
by the noteholders and majority support by the limited
partners) about the proposed refinancing. Certainly
everyone is looking out for their best interest, but if no
agreement can be reached, then an unsatisfactory solution
will result. Because there is significant preservation
equity in Georgetowne Houses, those involved in the
resyndication are willing to work together to maximize their
profit.
CHAPTER FOUR
LAKEVIEW TOWERS:SALE TEAMWORK
INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting aspects of this case study,
which is a sale of a property from a private syndication to
a non-profit buyer, is that the transaction has been
proceeding relatively smoothly. The seller pointed out that
the sale participants are a well qualified, cohesive team
whose different objectives were complementary. The seller
would like to maintain the management contract. The buyer
needs the expertise of a large scale management firm. HUD
would like to encourage sales of expiring use properties to
non-profits. Sale of the property was the primary goal of
all participants: the Plan of Action submitted by the seller
was, in his words, "extremely pro-tenant, therefore HUD had
to go along with the sale".
Because Lakeview Towers was the only subsidized
property owned by the seller, they were entangled in ELIHPA
and LIHPHRA without even knowing it. After finding out they
could not convert the property to market rate as originally
planned, they began to survey the available options. The
initial reaction was to refinance, as many other property
owners were doing. But because the owners were willing to
keep their options open, they were willing to listen when
several buyers approached. The sellers discovered selling
made a lot of sense in their particular case. Everything
about the process of selling meshed, and although it was
time consuming, the final deal is perceived as a "win-win"
situation for seller, buyer and tenants. Although the
property has not yet sold, the actual sale date has been
set. What made this transaction analogous to a typical
market rate transaction, rather than a subsidized sale, was
that there were two potential buyers (one was far superior
to the other). Furthermore, the seller maintained a certain
level of negotiating leverage by letting the prospective
buyers know that the owners were also seriously considering
refinancing.
BACKGROUND
Lakeview Towers is located across a major boulevard
from Lake Michigan. The development, financed under the
Section 221(d)3 program, consists of 500 housing units in
two high rise towers, 7,460 square feet of commercial space
and a 380 car parking garage. Section 221(d)3 encouraged
the production of low and moderate income housing during the
1960's by offering low interest loans to developers. In
exchange, developers agreed to certain rent, income and
dividend restrictions. The loans had 40 year terms, but
could be prepaid after 20 years at which time all of the use
restrictions would end.4 0 The prepayment date for Lakeview
Towers would have been January 13, 1991.
Aware of these circumstances, the Krupp Company, in
1984, purchased the property from the original developer.
According to David Olney, Senior Vice President, Property
Acquisitions and Sales, the motive was... "purely economic.
In 1991, we planned to take advantage of the upside in the
property and convert it to market rate units"." The Krupp
Companies are involved in property asset management,
mortgage financing real estate syndications. Lakeview
Towers was the company's only purchase of a federally
subsidized property.
Because the acquisition of the Chicago property was
relatively large, the purchase was split between two limited
partnerships, Krupp 4 and Krupp 5. Both of these limited
partnerships were intended to exist for 7 to 10 years and
expire around the same time as the conversion date of
Lakeview Towers. Each syndication was investing a total of
$50 million in a portfolio of market rate properties
focusing on garden and high rise apartments in Chicago,
Texas and Baltimore. The geographic diversification was an
attempt to minimize risk and stabilize performance. Because
of changes in market conditions during the mid 1980's, the
cash flow from the Chicago properties (both the subsidized
40 Cohen, Howard E., Flynn, Kathleen M., Sheehan, Kathleen M., "Memorandum to
Krupp Realty Company "(David J. Olney and Kathleen T. Bakon), Subject: Lakeview
Towers, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. May 3,1990, pl.
41 Interview: David Olney, SVP, Asset Management, Krupp Company, July 13,
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Lakeview Towers and the market rate Park Place apartments)
ended up offsetting losses in Texas.
In 1990, Krupp began to scrutinize the best possible
strategy to pursue regarding the syndications. At this
time, the owners of Lakeview thought the property could
still be converted to market rate. When ELIHPA was enacted
in 1988, Krupp was not even aware of the act. Because
Lakeview Towers was their only federally subsidized project,
the company had not been keeping abreast of changes in
prepayment restrictions. In 1990, when the owners finally
did discover Title II restricted their ability to go to
market rate, they enlisted the legal aid of Howard Cohen,
Kathleen Flynn and Kathleen Sheehan at Mintz, Levin et al.
Krupp wanted attorneys experienced with expiring use
properties to tell them what their possible options were.
But first, why did Krupp decide to focus on Lakeview
Towers and not some other properties in the portfolio?
Generally, the company likes to hold onto properties long
term. The Baltimore properties were performing well,
however market conditions in the area did not warrant a sale
and the lack of capital available in the financial markets
meant that refinancing objectives could not be met. The
Texas properties, suffering from deflated values, would have
meant a significant loss if sold now.
Therefore, Krupp focused on selling or refinancing the
Chicago properties, which had significant equity. Besides
Lakeview Towers, they owned Park Place Towers, a 950 unit
market rate high rise. Because Park Place required
substantial rehabilitation, there was insufficient equity in
the property. Furthermore, if there was to be a sale of any
property, the company preferred to sell subsidized Lakeview
Towers and keep the market rate Park Place in the portfolio.
The owners concluded that Lakeview seemed to offer the only
real opportunity to generate cash for the syndication.
OWNER OPTIONS
Initially, sale did not seem plausible to Krupp because
the property could no longer be converted to market rate
housing. To put it mildly, the owners were outraged, but in
talking to other owners, realized that they were locked in.
Therefore, the initial decision to refinance the property
was made. Krupp, through contacts in the Chicago market,
was aware that HUD was primarily interested in selling to
non-profits, nonetheless, they believed the best alternative
for the syndication was to proceed with a request to
refinance.
In a memorandum to the Krupp Company, legal counsel
presented five options from which the owners could choose.
The following is a synopsis of the memorandum addressed to
the owners:"
A. Prepay the loan and terminate all the use restrictions.
This is no longer realistically possible because of the
conditions which would have to be met. You [Krupp] would
have to prove that prepayment would not materially affect:
-- the supply of decent housing for lower and very low
income persons in the area.
-- the ability of lower and very low income persons to
find affordable housing near employment opportunities.
-- the housing opportunities of minorities.
In addition to federal law, Illinois state law must also be
considered; there are already two restrictive laws in this
area. Precedent indicates that the state would also not
allow removal of the (d)(3) restrictions.
B. Do nothing.
It does not appear that future opportunities will be
superior to what exists now. Doing nothing provides no
additional benefit to the owner.
C. Sell the development.
Federal law does not restrict you from selling to a
willing buyer. The difficulty here is finding a buyer who
will pay the price you want. You and a prospective buyer
are unlikely to agree on an acceptable price unless
incentives under Title II are part of the package. Thus
participation in a plan of action is necessary. Issues
regarding sale include:
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-- Do you want to sell?
-- What are the needs of the fund?
-- If you sell, can you retain the management contract?
-- Tax consequences of a sale must be considered.
Assuming some taxes must be paid upon sale, you will be
better off keeping the project and refinancing unless there
is a way to get additional incentives if you sell. If you
decide you want to sell, you will need to delve into the
numbers more deeply.
Illinois law gives tenants a right of first refusal to
buy the development from you ... but the law is unclear if
tenants have to match the sale price. You will have to
analyze the statute in more detail.
D. Refinance the development.
If the desire is to get cash from the deal as quickly
as possible, then a refinance is the preferred route. HUD
approval on additional debt as well as incentives which will
be necessary to support that additional debt will require a
plan of action.
E. Attempt to increase cash flow over time.
If the desire is to increase cash flow for future years
and not pull out appreciated equity immediately, then you
will not want to do an immediate refinancing. Plan of
action will still be required.
At the time of this memorandum (May 1990) LIHPRHA
(Title VI) had not yet been formally enacted. Therefore,
legal counsel advised the owners of possible incentives
which HUD might be willing to provide under ELIHPA:
TITLE II PROCESSING:
Incentives which HUD will provide include:
-- 30% income cap on rent increases for current tenants
-- Limits on rent increases for new tenants
-- Low interest capital improvement loans
-- FHA mortgage insurance for equity take out loans
-- Increased access to reserve accounts
-- Increased dividend distributions
-- Other incentives (e.g. low income housing tax
credits)
OWNER MOTIVATIONS
Based upon the information from the attorneys, Krupp
decided that refinancing was the best available alternative.
The owners looked at the options through various lenses:
owner as taxpayer, property manager, local developer. Krupp
also analyzed the strength of the prospective buyer and the
perception of local and federal government.
The owners began the refinance process by obtaining an
appraisal on the property. David Olney stated that
refinancing under Title II was advised by Cohen because
Title VI would surely be a more highly regulated process.
At about the same time, a group known as the Affordable
Housing and Preservation Fund contacted Krupp about selling
the project to them. Based in Colorado, this fund
eventually turned out to be a less than arms length non
profit. Apparently, their primary purpose was to generate
fee income by issuing bonds. They were not concerned about
sale prices (higher prices meant larger fees), nor were they
concerned about managing the properties after the sale.
There seemed to be a limitless upside to the deal. Krupp
eventually stopped negotiating with them for at least two
reasons: (1) AHPF was already having trouble with another
HUD deal and (2)Tenants were likely to fight a takeover by
AHPF which would mean further delays and a high risk of the
sale not being consummated.
But AHPF had pointed out several things which caused
Krupp to seriously start thinking about a sale instead of a
refinance:
-- the syndication had accumulated substantial passive
losses which could be used to offset capital gains. Because
exit taxes would be minimal, the owners could realize a
greater profit from sale than refinance.
-- If AHPF purchased the property, they would want Krupp to
continue managing the property.
Therefore, not only would a sale mean an additional $3 to $4
million more than a refinance would generate, but the owners
would also be able to keep the management contract for at
least three years.
In a recent interview, Kathleen Sheehan pointed out
that there were several reasons for Krupp to consider any
potential buyer. First, it might be the financially better
alternative and second, it was politically important.
Because Krupp owns another (market rate) apartment complex
in Chicago, Park Place, the owners needed to "keep a good
image" with the city and HUD (which had also financed the
market rate property). Even if Krupp ultimately ended up
refinancing, it was important to let the government know the
owners had not ignored potential buyers. Otherwise HUD,
which advocated non-profit ownership, might make the
refinance effort more difficult. Attorney Cohen's primary
concern with a sale was the potential tax liability. But
Krupp pointed out that any (or most) tax on the capital gain
from a sale would be offset by accumulated passive tax
losses on the property.
During the time of negotiations with AHPF, tenant
advocates also approached Krupp about selling the property.
Voice of the People (VOP) was a small management and housing
rehabilitation group which Olney describes as "capable,
knowledgeable and with surprising political pull: On an
earlier project, VOP had problems with HUD, and actually
were able to get U.S. Secretary Jack Kemp to personally deal
with solving the problem during a visit to Chicago.
43 Interview: Kathleen M. Sheehan, Mintz Levin, et al, July 22, 1992.
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According to Olney, VOP had numerous reasons why it
wanted to become involved in Lakeview Towers:
1. Maintain the affordability of the project.
2. Tenant advocacy which encouraged resident
support.
3. Within 7 to 10 years turn the project over to
the tenants.
4. VOP would become a high profile player(?)
5. Income boost to VOP: 5% construction and
management fee would be about $350,000.
Olney was particularly impressed by the president of VOP,
whom he saw as a great team builder and mediator. Olney was
never concerned about the ability of VOP to follow through
with a sale, but there was always the concern about the
amount of time involved in the process. The owners realized
that in addition to political muscle, VOP had the tenants on
their side.
Attorney Sheehan also felt confident about the
capabilities of VOP. Besides talking to other Chicago based
attorneys about VOP's reputation, the attorney was impressed
by the high quality of consultants which VOP hired to handle
the community group's side of the transaction and
negotiations.
It surprised the advocacy group that they had to earn
the confidence of the tenants. Perhaps VOP relationship
with ONE, a militant tenant group, concerned the residents.
There was concern that they would become involved in legal
and political battles while the property was left
unattended. Olney points out that tenants were generally
happy with the apartments, especially the good views,
convenience to downtown and good security. Therefore they
were distrustful of advocates disrupting their lives. But
eventually the tenants were fully supportive of VOP. Krupp
realized that it was illogical to continue negotiations with
the other potential buyer, AHPF. The tenants and HUD would
never support what looked more and more like a business
fronting as a non-profit. Therefore Krupp ceased
negotiations with AHPF and focused their energy on working
with VOP.
VOP, as a potential buyer, clearly had negotiating
leverage which appealed to Krupp. VOP welcomed a 3 year
management commitment from Krupp to gain expertise. As a
prospective buyer, VOP was willing to go to whatever price
was necessary to purchase the property. This tenant
advocate group even had bond financing available to them for
the purchase. VOP had convinced the city of the excellent
public relations that would come from helping to preserve
affordable housing in Chicago. What better opportunity than
to provide bond financing for a high profile property like
Lakeview Towers? Krupp had been concerned at first that
this added layer of bureaucracy would make the process even
slower, but the city actually moved quickly. But as it
turns out, it was HUD that slowed the process.
The proposed sale was producing an excellent team of
players:
-- The prospective buyer, VOP, was experienced, well
connected politically and financially, and had the support
of the tenants and the city.
-- The seller, although inexperienced with subsidized
properties, was willing to negotiate, and was also well
connected (having done business with legal counsel on both
sides of the deal). The seller also had the support of the
tenants.
-- Government, especially local, strongly supported
non-profit purchasers. When Krupp finally submitted a Plan
of Action after signing a purchase and sale agreement, May
10, 1991, the owners believed that HUD would also support
such a 'pro-tenant' plan of action.
Krupp's attorneys found this deal went comparatively
smoothly. The owner's second appraisal of $22.5 million was
consistent with HUD's appraisal of $21 million, the primary
difference being attributed to rehabilitation costs. The
buyer's request for a $7 million flexible subsidy loan was
also approved. Nonetheless, the transaction is scheduled to
close at the end of August, at which time Olney can breathe
a sigh of relief - 15 months after the contract had been
signed.
Attorney Sheehan points out that the deal was unique
"because it (the deal) was very much driven by the seller,
especially David Olney. He is well organized, analytical
and very committed to a quick turnover". In fact, Olney had
orchestrated much of the processing by generating a weekly
list of things that needed to be done. All of the
participants in the transaction were sent weekly memos by
David so that everyone knew exactly what had to be done next
and by whom.
In choosing to sell, Krupp was able to address the
motivations of the owner in the various roles of taxpayer,
developer, and property manager:
1. Accrued passive tax losses would be used to offset
passive gains from the sale. The limited partners would
experience minimal cash impact, assuming they had not used
passive losses from this project previously. Most of the
nroceeds will be re invested in 1-h Con1ei-ine
2. Cash would now be available for renovations on Park
Place and to upgrade the Texas properties.
3. Krupp was promised the management contract, which will
be a 70/30 split (Krupp/VOP) for the next 3 years. Tenants
were concerned that Krupp would leave, but regulations would
not allow the agreement to be written into the contract.
The owner also was strongly motivated to sell because
of Krupp's perceptions of the two other players in the deal,
government and tenants:
1. Krupp now realizes that HUD definitely leans toward
non-profit ownership. This probably helped speed the
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processing of the transaction. Likewise, the city supported
the sale, and therefore was willing to process the bond
financing quickly.
2. Tenants, acting through VOP, proved to be very capable
buyers. They not only followed through on completing the
transaction, but the tenants actually were able to help
speed up the processing.
CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction: The Multiple Roles of Owners
The primary motivation for private sector investment in
affordable housing has been to make a profit. The Krupp
Company readily acknowledges that the reason they became
involved in Lakeview Towers was purely economic. Many of
the limited partnerships that were created, like
Georgetowne, invested in subsidized housing to take
advantage of tax deductible losses. With the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, most of these losses were no longer deductible.
Federal restrictions on prepayment through ELIHPA and later,
LIHPHRA, imposed further limitations on the potential to
generate an acceptable (to the owners and investors) rate of
return. Therefore, the opportunity to reclaim as much of
their original investment as possible, either through sale
or refinance, became paramount to private owners and
investors in expiring use properties.
But the process by which that maximization could occur
was often unclear and often shifting. If the world could be
reduced to a simple model, there would be three players and
three solutions. The participants would be: an owner, a
tenant and the government. The three
the property, sell or refinance it.
OWNER
GOVERNMENT
options would be: hold
TENANT
BASIC TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP
GENERAL PARTNER
OWNER
PROPERTY MANAGER
PERSONALITY TYPE
SAVVY?
TENANTS
ADVERSARY?
SUPPORTIVE?
DEVELOPER ORGANIZED?
GOVERNMENT
UNCERTAINTY REGULATIONS
BUREAUCRATIC
EXAMPLES OF COMPLEXITIES OF OWNER DECISION MAKING
TAXPAYER
A simple, rational rule of thumb says that the owner should
take the option that offers the most opportunity for profit.
But such a rule fails to consider the multiplicity of issues
involved in "maximum profit", i.e. the two other players
(tenant & government) and their motivations. For example,
the owner may be unsure of the capabilities of a non-profit
buyer to be able to complete the purchase, or the owner
might be concerned that there will be insufficient funding
from the federal government. The rule also fails to account
for a complex set of players representing owner interests.
The owner is often not an individual, but rather, a general
partner with limited partners who may have differing tax
liability, and conflicting goals. The GP may want to
refinance in order to maintain the management contract, or
because they want to maintain a positive image in the local
development community. For the limiteds, on the other hand,
it may be more beneficial to sell. Ultimately calculating
what is the best choice for the owner is a function of a set
of complex, often personal and political decisions. The
option which an owner ultimately chooses must then be seen
as extending beyond the profit maximization decision.
There is not "the owner"; instead there is the owner as
property manager, as local developer, personal decision
maker, taxpayer and general partner overseeing the interests
of the limited partnership. It becomes obvious that the
different roles are intertwined: the general partner is also
concerned about taxes, etc. After analyzing "the owner",
it is important to examine how owners perceive the tenants
and the government, the two other players involved with
expiring use properties. The following discussion explores
the various owner roles and how they often compete. It
becomes necessary to juggle different roles at the same
time.
The Owner as Taxpayer
Investors became involved in limited partnerships like
Georgetowne and Krupp for the tax deductions. The general
partner, acting on behalf of the investors, explored the
various tax implications of selling verses refinancing.
Sale of the property would create a significant tax event
which might possibly be minimized using passive losses.
But the tax situation was even more complex with the
decision to refinance. An owner who "stays in" will receive
a taxable income stream which is really comprised of two
basic elements: "phantom income" and preservation yield.
Phantom income is the excess of taxable income over matching
cash flow (Amortization of principle now exceeds
depreciation on whatever remains of the original asset
base.). Preservation yield is constant; a steadily rising
income stream similar to a subordinated debenture. Without
a refinance, all of this is taxable. If there is a
refinancing, an ever increasing amount will be principal.
Years after the closing, tax liability may exceed cash
available to pay for it. Thus the phantom income problem is
exacerbated by refinancing via an equity take out loan".
A second tax consequence of refinancing is that reserve
funding will probably be increased, making the phantom
income situation still worse. Deposits to reserves are
nondeductible; withdrawals cannot be expensed but rather
must be amortized over several years. Therefore reserves
are perceived as a hidden source of income and therefore
taxable.
The tax situation of the owners plays a major part in
the decision to refinance or sell. Beacon Company (advised
by Boston Financial), as the general Partner for Georgetowne
Houses, emphasized the benefits of refinancing rather than a
sale to a non profit. First, investors could minimize
present tax liability by refinancing, and second, lost time
would be minimized (approximately 18 months to refinance
verses almost 4 years to process a sale). But the equity
take out loan from a refinance may not have tax deductible
interest if the proceeds are not reinvested.
Krupp, initially intending to refinance, also looked
closely at the tax impacts. But they discovered that the
capital gain from a sale could be offset by passive losses
of the partnership. Reinvestment of sale proceeds could
44 Smith, David A. "Optimizing Financing In Preservation Recapitalizations",
Recapitalization Advisors, Boston, MA, November 1990, p 2.
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also help defer capital gains taxes. Therefore, sale made
financial sense.
The tax situation of individual investors has to be
examined. It is very important to realize that owner
motivations are strongly related to the tax implications of
selling or refinancing.
The Owner and the Limited Partner
Maximizing the return on investment becomes more complicated
in situations where a property, such as Georgetowne, was
re-syndicated in the early 1980's. According to Peter
Richardson at BFG, new limited partnerships were formed to
generate a new "pot of money and restart the depreciation
clock"4" on these subsidized housing projects. But
investors in the old partnerships were not completely bought
out, and became mortgagees. The high interest notes (due to
interest which would be paid at the end of fifteen years)
were tax deductible losses for the investors in the new
partnership. With the tax law changes of 1986, the losses
associated with these notes were no longer as valuable. Any
sale or refinance would trigger acceleration of these notes.
Furthermore, ELIHPA effectively prevented any sale from
occurring until the government could figure out what to do.
This situation created the need for negotiation.
Because a refinance would mean that the GP gets his return
45 Interview: Peter Richardson, Asset Management, Boston Financial Group, July
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on equity, and the note holders get their return, the
likelihood of remaining funds for the limited partners is
remote. The limiteds are unlikely to approve a sale or
refinance unless they can be assured of a reasonable return
of their original investment. Therefore, those properties
which have enough preservation equity to justify refinancing
also need to have second noteholders who are willing to
renegotiate: the noteholders get a smaller yield and the
limiteds get a corresponding yield. Beacon perceived itself
as the mediator or negotiator between the limiteds and the
noteholders. From the viewpoint of the General Partner,
half a deal is better than no deal and actually looked like
a better deal than some of the alternatives when the notes
came due in 1998.
It is easy to imagine situations where re-syndication
has created additional conflict in the effort to sell or
refinance. For example, if there is little value to a
project beyond the outstanding federal loans, then the
noteholders might be unwilling to take a discount on the
amount owed, in the hope that there will be a future value
in 1998. Or the Limited Partners may be unwilling to agree
to refinance because their entire investment will be wiped
out after paying back outstanding federal and second
mortgages.
The situation involving re-syndications is not unique.
According to Robert Johnson"6 , a financial consultant
interested in securitizing these second notes, there are
"hundreds of millions of dollars worth of these second notes
in existence. If the maturity dates are considered, the
value would be in the billions". At the current time he
believes that the notes are virtually unsalable to buyers
outside of the partnership, therefore the notes would
require a huge discount. He also notes that there is a
diversity of opinion as to what the notes are worth. It
would depend on the value of the property and the legal
quality of the paper.
According to Boston Financial, many projects in the
southeastern U.S. have values nearly equivalent to their
outstanding federal loan balances, therefore there has been
very little negotiation among the ownership interests. But
in high demand areas like Boston, there is substantial
equity to justify the refinancing effort. This is the same
scenario that existed in the late 1980's when the GAO study
was undertaken.
The Owner as Property Manager
As if the decision to sell, refinance or hold were not
complex enough, there is the question of management
contracts. Control over potentially lucrative management
contracts has been handled in different ways by different
owners. The seller of Castle Square did not want to manage
the property. Winn Management, who will be co-general
46 Interview: Robert Johnson, Securities Analyst, June 30, 1992
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partner for 5 years as part of the transitional ownership,
will also oversee the management for the next 15 years.
Beacon Company will retain the property management contract
upon refinancing Georgetowne. The Krupp Company, although
selling the project to a non-profit, will keep the
management contract for at least three years.
Full service real estate companies like Boston
Financial Group were concerned that there might be a
conflict between the best interests of the limited partners
(possible sale) and the priorities of the property
management division (retain the management contract).
However, this has proven not to be the case. BFG is
advising clients that "staying in" through refinancing under
Title II is the best option for the limited partners.
Fortunately for BFG, refinancing also allows Boston
Financial to keep the property management contracts as well.
David Smith of Recapitalization Advisors goes on to say
that the larger the portfolio of subsidized projects, the
greater the likelihood of refinancing precisely in order to
retain the property management fees. Since many of these
subsidized properties are held in large portfolios then it
follows that most of these properties will be refinanced.
BFG, in their list of available options, points out that
most owners are choosing to refinance under Title II.
Therefore, it is likely that retaining the management
contract reinforces the decision to refinance, rather than
being the pivotal issue.
The Owner as Personal Decision Maker
There is a domain of decision within which the
rationale of the owner is not quantifiable.
(1) Personal circumstances have caused the owner to simply
want to get out of the deal. Perhaps they are tired of
dealing with the voluminous paperwork; possibly an heir has
no interest in continuing ownership. This was the case with
the Druker Company and Castle Square. The owners did not
want to deal with the subsidized housing market and made
every effort to get out.
The motivation might have to do with the perception of
the neighborhood: if it is deteriorating, get out now. An
undesirable location may eliminate the owner's incentive to
continue dealing with the property. The opposite could
also be true. If the owner believes that the location or
the real estate market is improving, then the inclination
might be to wait. Yet as BFG pointed out, a dramatic
recovery is unlikely in the Boston area market for at least
several years.
(2) Another aspect of the expiring use issue which comes
into play is the mentality of owners involved in the process
of selling or refinancing their properties. This is not a
judgement of whether a developer is "good" or "bad" at
subsidized housing. As Arthur Winn pointed out, Ron Druker
is very good at what he does, but he does not want to do
subsidized housing. Therefore, Druker was locked into a
mindset of getting out of the business, and he ultimately
paid the price in concessions to the tenants. Winn, on the
other hand, considers himself an expert in the subsidized
housing field, and tried to work with the process.
Ultimately, he found Castle Square to be a learning process.
He was bemused, rather than embittered, by the tenants
savvy.
(3) The importance of maintaining a positive image is
important to an owner who is also a local developer. There
may be political or public relations issues involved:
particularly if the owner is planning to develop and has a
prominent presence in the community, he/she will be
sensitive to any attempts to change the status of the
project by selling or refinancing. If the owner is trying
to develop anything else in the locale, the negative
publicity will not help his cause. Beacon notes that if
they had tried to convert Georgetowne at the same time as
they were developing Rowes Wharf on the Boston waterfront,
they would never have gotten the project through the local
permitting process.
After having examined the internal complexities of the
owner, the focus of the collective voices of "the owner"
then turns toward the other players who are the tenants and
the government.
THE OWNER AND THE TENANTS
While the owner has to deal with some or all of the
preceding roles which create a complex image of "owner", it
is also necessary to deal with tenants, sometimes
represented by advocates. Companies like Krupp and Beacon
had managed the properties well during the emergence of the
expiring use prepayment issue, therefore the tenants
actually wanted them to continue managing. Tenant adversity
seems to come more from poorly managed properties like
Castle Square.
One reason an owner might be motivated to chose
refinancing over a sale is the questionable strength of the
non-profit buyer. Especially if Title VI requires more than
a year to allow the nonprofit to secure financing, the owner
wants to be sure the year is not wasted with a group that
can not complete the transaction. Ironically, the community
group is also unsure of their capabilities to secure
financing until they are well into the process.
Beacon found it highly improbable that a community
group would be able to purchase a large project like
Georgetowne, therefore the choice to refinance was further
emphasized. Krupp, on the other hand, increasingly became
convinced of the strength of the prospective buyer, and was
more strongly motivated to sell than to refinance. Judging
the capacity of the tenants as owners then becomes a
critical decision for the seller.
THE OWNER AND THE GOVERNMENT
The risk of diminished funding through HUD offsets any
incentive that may exist for an owner to do nothing and
wait. Developers who have been involved in the roller
coaster cycle of federal programs over the past twenty years
all seem to have a similar attitude toward federal programs.
In the words of Beacon Company's William Stetson, "You'd
better take what you can get when you can get it".17 Over
time the rules change or funding runs out.
Similarly, Boston Financial believes that the time to
take advantage of federal programs is when they first become
available. In dealing with expiring use properties, BFG has
a consistent strategy of refinancing now rather than waiting
to sell or refinance in the future. "Act now, otherwise the
option disappears"."
Likewise, Recapitalization Advisors believes that the
federal government does not often make innovative programs
available for investment, therefore when a suitable program
does come along, there is a limited "window of opportunity".
Investors should be ready to act before the program ends or
becomes more restrictive. Perhaps this is a self
47 Stetson, July 6,1992
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fulfilling prophecy: if a program is beneficial (to
investors as well as the general public), then there are a
large number of investors who will commit to the program.
Therefore, available funding is rapidly absorbed, and the
program terminates quickly. Perhaps there is also
government concern that with such tremendous interest, the
feds must surely be giving something away. What ever the
reasons on the part of the government, the experience of
companies like BFG has been to act immediately when new
federal programs become available.
A frequent complaint heard by owners has been
bureaucratic standstill, especially when dealing with the
federal offices of HUD. There may be apprehension on the
part of owners that once a Plan of Action has been
submitted, it will remain in the pipeline for years. The
Krupp Company wanted to first get a sense from the
government "of the path of least resistance" in an effort to
choose the sale or refinance option that would cause the
least bureaucratic slowdowns. The interminable delays were
undoubtedly a reinforcement to the frustrated seller of
Castle Square that he should definitely get out of
subsidized housing. The U.S. General Accounting Office
also notes this deficiency in the processing of both sales
and refinances: GAO recommends that the expertise and
efficiency of HUD staff be improved to deal more effectively
with local markets and specific property owners.
FINAL COMMENTS
This thesis has focused on owner characteristics and
perceptions in dealing with expiring use properties under
the current federally regulated environment. It becomes
clear that the situation is much more complex than a simple
triangular relationship among the owner, the tenant and the
government.
The owners are actually a complex entity wearing
different hats, sometimes simultaneously: developer,
property manager, general partner in a limited partnership,
taxpayer. Different owner personalities approach expiring
use properties with different motivations. While these
dynamic worlds of property manager, general partner, etc.
are sometimes conflicting, they can also be complementary.
For example, a general partner that wants to refinance also
benefits by keeping the management contract.
The owner of an expiring use property is trying to
chose the best option (hold, sell, refinance) which reflects
the various ownership roles. However, the enactment of
prepayment restrictions and the various incentives designed
to keep the housing affordable adds additional complexity to
the sale or refinance process. The owner is now confronted
with a series of choices under Title II and Title VI. .
Financial advisors point to refinancing under Title II
as generally the best alternative. But the advisors will
also admit that each situation is unique. An owner might
have a greater motivation to sell for particular reasons
which are not just financial, but are likely to include
other reasons such as personal, political, etc. Therefore,
the nonfinancial variables which affect the ultimate
decision of the owner can be more influential than anyone
would like to admit.
The importance of noneconomic motivations was also
cited in the GAO report. In attempting to predict
prepayments of expiring use properties, the GAO noted a
significant weakness in the National Low Income Housing
Preservation Commission model: the model was unable to
measure the effect of noneconomic variables on owners
decisions to prepay. This weakness severely limited the
usefulness of the estimates about prepayment. Similarly,
after the enactment of LIHPHRA, the difficulty in trying to
measure the non-economic variables influencing an owner's
choice to hold, sell or refinance still exists. But
hopefully, this thesis creates a greater awareness of the
different variables.
The expiring use issue can not be reduced to:
experts = success and nonexperts = disaster.
Krupp, completely unfamiliar with the prepayment process,
had a relatively smooth transition in their sale to Voice of
the People. It was more than luck. It was due to a
methodological analysis of the options in their broadest
institutional, as well as-financial sense. The analysis was
followed by a determination of the best available
alternative and then an analysis of the best way to get
there. Along the way, a better option presented itself, and
the owner was ready to take advantage of it. Krupp figured
out who were the players, and kept the lines of
communication open. In the end, Krupp took advantage of
the best option for them, which turned out to be the best
option for the other players. Everyone achieved their goal.
Krupp sold (as originally planned when they acquired the
property in 1984), tenants bought (housing remains
affordable) and the government tried to minimize costs.
Krupp actually believed that they should have gotten a
slightly higher price for the property, but ended up taking
less in order to keep the deal from derailing. This is not
unlike a true market transaction. It also is remarkably
similar to the "ideal world" between owners, tenants and the
government discussed in the introduction.
If the goal of both the government and tenants is to
preserve affordable housing, and private capital is needed,
then it is crucial to understand the expiring use situation
through the lens of the owner. Richard J. High, employed by
a private builder of subsidized housing,'9 states:
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We are motivated, of course, by profit, but also
by a measure of social commitment and an interest
in helping to puzzle out the difficult problem of
housing the poor. There are many like us.
If there is to be a successful framework for creating
affordable housing programs which involve the private
sector, it is necessary to first understand where we are
today. This thesis has looked at the complexities of being
an owner to try and understand the reasons for the choices
owners make. By looking at owners actions under current
legislation, lessons can be learned about what does and does
not work in preserving privately owned, but publicly
subsidized, affordable housing. It will then be possible to
incorporate this knowledge into the next generation of
affordable housing programs.
1991, p. 2 6 .
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